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I. INTRODUCTION 
Perdue v. Kenny A.1 presents a unique opportunity for the Su-
preme Court to clarify whether fees awarded pursuant to a federal 
fee-shifting statute may ever be enhanced on the basis of the quality 
of performance and results obtained by the winning litigants’ attor-
neys.2 Over twenty-five years ago, Justice Brennan decried the loss of 
the “straightforward command [of federal fee-shifting statutes to] . . . 
a vast body of artificial, judge-made doctrine, . . . which like a Frank-
enstein’s monster meanders its well-intentioned way through the legal 
landscape leaving waste and confusion . . . in its wake.”3 The lack of 
uniformity and clarity among the courts regarding what are permissi-
ble considerations when determining a “reasonable attorney’s fee” 
demonstrates the significant impact the Supreme Court’s intervention 
could have in taming “Frankenstein’s monster” for good. 
Calculation of attorneys’ fees under federal fee-shifting statutes 
has relied heavily upon the “lodestar” method, which multiplies hours 
worked by an hourly rate subject to various enhancements and ad-
justments.4 In Perdue, the Supreme Court will necessarily address two 
                                                     
2011 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Perdue v. Kenny A., No. 08-970 (U.S. argued Oct. 14, 2009). 
 2. Compare Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Perdue v. Kenny A., No. 08-970 (U.S. Jan. 
29, 2009), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1907 (2009) (setting out a question presented that asks if a 
“reasonable attorney’s fee award . . .  [can] ever be enhanced based solely on quality of per-
formance and results obtained when these factors already are included in the lodestar calcula-
tion”) (emphasis added), with Brief in Opposition at i, Perdue v. Kenny A., No. 08-970 (U.S. 
Mar. 4, 2009) (setting out a question presented that asks if the “District Court abuse[s] its dis-
cretion in awarding an upward adjustment of the initial lodestar fee, based upon specific record 
findings of superior performance and exceptional success”). 
 3. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 455 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). 
 4. The term “‘lodestar’ stems from the figure’s role as ‘the guiding light of [the Court’s] 
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related issues concerning the lodestar, and perhaps consider a third. 
First, the Court will consider what factors are properly included in the 
determination of a “reasonable attorney’s fee” under the Civil Rights 
Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976 (“section 1988”),5 the federal fee-
shifting statute. Second, the Court will address whether the current 
method for calculating fees appropriately accounts for these factors. 
Third, the Court may decide to consider whether a wholesale depar-
ture from the traditional approach in calculating fees might better re-
flect section 1988’s goal of providing reasonable fees to winning liti-
gants. 
This term, the Supreme Court will hear “an unprecedented num-
ber of cases addressing fundamental aspects of professional responsi-
bility and regulation of the legal profession.”6 As one of those cases, 
Perdue has the potential to alter an aspect of practice that not only 
resonates personally with all practicing attorneys, but could also pro-
vide the impetus for the entire legal community to address, head-on, 
the changing market for its services.  
“Perdue arose out of Georgia’s dysfunctional foster care system” 
and culminated in major substantive reforms intended to eliminate 
the system’s biggest problems.7 The district court awarded the winning 
litigants’ attorneys $6 million plus a seventy-five percent enhance-
ment for their services. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the lower court’s 
award and enhancement not because it believed such an award was 
merited, but because it was constrained by precedent.8 In reviewing 
the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court will likely con-
                                                                                                                          
fee-shifting jurisprudence.” Case Comment, Attorneys’ Fees—Fee Enhancement, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 339 n.13 (1992) (citing City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992)). 
 5. The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 2000) 
(granting a court, in its discretion, the authority to permit the prevailing party to recover “a rea-
sonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs”). 
 6. Renee Newman Knake, Prioritizing Professional Responsibility and the Legal Profes-
sion: A Preview of the United States Supreme Court’s 2009–2010 Term, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 1, 1 (2009) (discussing seven cases the Court had already agreed to hear 
regarding the “role of attorneys and the practice of law”). 
 7. Scott Street, Perdue v. Kenny A.: Is the “Lodestar” Approach Adequate for Calculating 
Attorney’s Fees? (Argument Recap), SCOTUS WIKI, Nov. 11, 2009, http://www.scotuswiki.com/ 
index.php?title=Perdue_v._Kenny_A. 
 8. Kenny A. v. Perdue, 532 F.3d 1209, 1236 (11th Cir. 2008). All three judges on the Elev-
enth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The majority opinion represents the views of 
Judge Carnes and Judge Hill except with respect to Part VI in which Judge Hill did not concur. 
The majority affirmed the district court’s decision because of the “prior precedent rule,” which, 
it stated, necessitated its affirmation despite the fact that the district court’s enhancement could 
not “be squared with [] Supreme Court decisions.” Id. at 1225. Judge Wilson, writing the minor-
ity opinion, found the district court’s decision legally and judicially sound. Id. at 1242 (Wilson, 
J., concurring). 
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strue prior Court rulings to find that the district court’s fee enhance-
ment was improper and that public policy concerns regarding exorbi-
tant fee enhancements necessitate vacating the award. This Comment 
argues, however, that there are sound reasons to hold the enhance-
ment was justified and that relevant market considerations support 
affirming the district court’s decision. 
II. FACTS 
What began as an effort to improve the quality of life for thou-
sands of children in Georgia’s foster care system now ends as a battle 
over how much to pay attorneys in Perdue v. Kenny A. In Perdue, nine 
foster children in the custody of the Georgia Department of Human 
Resources (DHR) sued the Governor of Georgia, DHR, and others 
on behalf of themselves and 3,000 foster children within two Georgia 
counties.9 The plaintiffs alleged fifteen causes of action under state 
and federal law as a result of “systematic deficiencies” in the State 
foster care system.10 The federal claims, alleged pursuant to 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1983,11 were for violations of the “class members’ Four-
teenth Amendment rights to substantive and procedural due process 
and their First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to liberty, 
privacy, and association.”12 
The case, which officially began in 2002, came to a head in 2005 
when the district court recommended that the parties attend media-
tion in an effort to address the plaintiffs’ complaints.13 After four 
months and more than 110 hours spent in eighteen separate media-
tion sessions, the parties settled.14 The settlement included thirty-one 
                                                     
 9. Kenny A., 532 F.3d at 1214–15. The other defendants are the commissioners of DHR, 
Fulton and DeKalb Counties, and the counties’ respective departments and directors of family 
and children services. 
 10. Id. at 1215. Alleged deficiencies included: “(1) assigning excessive numbers of cases to 
inadequately trained and poorly supervised caseworkers; (2) not developing a sufficient number 
of foster homes properly screened to ensure the plaintiff children’s safety; and (3) not identify-
ing adult relatives who could care for the plaintiff children as an alternative to strangers or im-
personal institutions,” among other problems. Id. 
 11. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1996) (providing the substan-
tive right under which a winning litigant may then pursue recovery for their attorneys’ fees un-
der section 1988). 
 12. Kenny A., 532 F.3d at 1215. The plaintiffs also alleged state claims such as violations of 
their “substantive due process and equal protection rights under the Georgia Constitution,” and 
other State statutes. Id. To remedy these allegations, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and in-
junctive relief. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. The plaintiff class and Fulton and DeKalb counties settled in 2006; their agreement 
is not on appeal. Id. at 1216. The defendants involved in this settlement, and the case before the 
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substantive and procedural remedies to the State’s foster care system, 
as well as recovery for the expenses of litigation and reasonable at-
torneys’ fees and costs for the plaintiffs.15 Despite the defendants’ ac-
knowledgement that they would bear the costs of counsel, the parties 
were unable to agree on “reasonable fees,” and consequently filed 
with the district court for an awards determination.16 
The plaintiffs’ attorneys requested approximately $14.2 million in 
fees—$7.1 million for the 30,000 hours allegedly spent working on the 
case (the lodestar) plus another $7.1 million17 as an enhancement for 
“achiev[ing] exceptional results vindicating the constitutional and 
statutory rights of thousands of children of a classwide basis.”18 The 
defendants objected to both the lodestar figure and the enhancement, 
arguing that the plaintiffs’ attorneys overbilled and provided records 
“too vague to support a claim for compensation.”19 The defendants 
also alleged that an enhanced fee would result in double-counting be-
cause “the skill of the plaintiffs’ attorneys in litigating the case [was 
already] taken into account in setting their hourly rates.”20 
The district court awarded a total of $10.5 million to the winning 
litigants—a $6 million fee award and a $4.5 million enhancement.21 
The court arrived at the $6 million fee by “granting in full each hourly 
rate requested,” then reducing the number of hours reportedly spent 
on non-travel related matters by fifteen percent, and halving the 
hourly rates for time spent traveling.22 The district court then en-
hanced the lodestar award by seventy-five percent because it decided 
that this award did not fully cover class counsels’ $1.7 million ad-
vancement for expenses, their lack of payment on an on-going basis, 
                                                                                                                          
Supreme Court, are the governor of Georgia, Department of Human Resources for the state of 
Georgia (DHR), DHR’s commissioner, Fulton and DeKalb County’s Department of Family 
and Children Services, and the respective directors of those departments. Id. 
 15. Id. These fees were shifted to the defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 and FED. 
R. CIV. P. 23(h). 
 16. Id. at 1217. 
 17. Id. The exact amount the plaintiffs’ attorneys sought was a total of $14,342,860—
$7,171,434.30 in compensation for the 29,908.73 hours they (and their paralegals) claimed to 
have worked plus $7,171,434.30 as an enhancement. 
 18. Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Award Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses of Litigation at 3, 
Kenny A. v. Perdue, No. 1:02-cv-01686-MHS (N.D. Ga. Dec. 9, 2005). 
 19. Kenny A., 532 F.3d at 1217. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1217–18. The exact amounts are $6,012,802.90 for the basic fee award and 
$4,509,602.00 as an enhancement, totaling $10,522,405.08. The district court reduced the re-
quested lodestar by fifteen percent (or $1,158,631.40) because it found some billing entries too 
vague or excessive. Id. at 1217. 
 22. Id. at 1218. 
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and the “completely contingent” nature of recovery in the case.23 Fur-
ther, the court “found that ‘the superb quality of [counsels’] represen-
tation far exceeded what could reasonably be expected for the stan-
dard hourly rates used to calculate the [fee]’.”24 
The Eleventh Circuit, despite expressing an unwillingness to sup-
port the fee enhancement and the lodestar award,25 affirmed in full 
the district court’s decision.26 If not for controlling precedent,27 the 
Eleventh Circuit majority stated, it would have reversed.28 What now 
remains before the Supreme Court is to decide whether the quality of 
representation and results obtained are fully accounted for in the 
lodestar, and if they are not, if enhancement based upon these factors 
is proper.29 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Under the American Rule, “the prevailing party may not recover 
attorneys’ fees as costs or otherwise.”30 A losing litigant, however, will 
pay the winning litigant’s attorneys’ fees if the action falls under one 
of the many statutory exceptions to the American Rule authorized by 
Congress.31 If the Court decides to redefine what constitutes reason-
                                                     
 23. Id. (quoting Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 454 F.Supp.2d 1260, 1288 (N.D. Ga. 
2005)). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 1220. 
 26. Id. at 1236–37 (“Unfortunately, under the prior panel precedent rule we are not free to 
decide the enhancement issue, but must instead follow this Court’s earlier decisions . . . .”). The 
Eleventh Circuit also dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal. The plaintiffs have not sought further re-
view. 
 27. See NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding a fee award 
may be enhanced in some cases); Norman v. Hous. Auth., 836 F.2d 1292, 1302 (11th Cir. 1988) 
(remanding in part because the court failed to consider whether an upward adjustment to the 
lodestar was merited). 
 28. Kenny A., 532 F.3d at 1238 (“[A]s a later panel we are bound to follow [prior Eleventh 
Circuit decisions].”). 
 29. Id. at 1219–20. The defendants also claimed that the district court should not have 
compensated the plaintiffs’ lawyers for all claimed photocopying expenses and that they were 
compensated for an unreasonable number of hours. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower 
court’s ruling with regard to these claims as well. 
 30. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975) (affirming the 
rule that parties should bear the costs of their own representation and that only Congress, not 
the courts, may authorize exceptions to this rule); see Dan B. Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees 
Against Adversaries: Introducing the Problem, 1986 DUKE L. J. 435, 435 (citing Arcambel v. 
Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306 (1796), as the birthplace of the American Rule). The American Rule is an 
unusual feature of American civil litigation. “Most other countries with comp[a]rable litigation 
systems use some form of fee shifting.” Id. at 435, n.1. 
 31. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 913 
(3d ed. 2002) (“More than 180 federal statutes and 4,000 state statutes authorize awards of at-
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able attorneys’ fees under one of the fee-shifting statutes, then all 
other fee-shifting statutes will be reinterpreted accordingly.32 One 
such fee-shifting statute—and the statute at issue—is the Civil Rights 
Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976 (“section 1988”). Under section 
1988(b), a court, “in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a 
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs” incurred in a federal 
civil rights action.33 
Awarding a reasonable fee under the federal fee-shifting statutes 
is a two-step process:34 (1) determine the “number of hours reasona-
bly expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly 
rate,”35 and (2) consider whether an upward or downward adjustment 
is merited.36 Beyond showing a general unwillingness to enhance at-
torneys’ fees, the Supreme Court has never explicitly precluded courts 
from engaging in this process.37 Supreme Court precedent provides for 
courts, “in [their] discretion,” to adjust attorneys’ fees so that they 
may in fact be “reasonable” under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988.38 It is less clear 
whether this precedent permits the courts to adjust fees based on fac-
tors that may already be considered by some to be sufficiently ac-
counted for in the initial fee calculation. 
“Congress enacted the fee-shifting provision of section 1988 to 
encourage lawyers to accept representations in meritorious civil rights 
                                                                                                                          
torneys’ fees.”). Other statutory exceptions to the American Rule include the Equal Access to 
Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(b) and (d); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
2000e-5(k); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7413(b), 7604(d), 7607(f), 7622(b)(2)(B); Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 2060(c) and (f), 2072(a), 2073; Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 
1640(a)(3), and others. Brief for United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11, 
Perdue v. Kenny A., No. 08-970 (U.S. June 29, 2009). 
 32. Case Comment, supra note 4, at 338 n.3 (“The Supreme Court has noted that the gen-
erally similar wording among fee-shifting statutes is a ‘strong presumption that they are to be in-
terpreted alike’.” (citing Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758 n.2 (1989) 
(internal citation omitted)); see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983) (finding 
“[t]he legislative history of § 1988 indicates that Congress intended that ‘the standards for 
awarding fees be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act’. 
The standards set forth in this opinion are generally applicable in all cases in which Congress 
has authorized an award of fees to a ‘prevailing party’.”). 
 33. The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 2000). 
 34. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley I), 478 
U.S. 546 (1986). 
 35. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. 
 36. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898 (1984) (addressing the “remaining” issue in the 
case—whether it is appropriate to adjust the fee); see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (furthering 
the point that the “product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not end the in-
quiry”). 
 37. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 901 (rejecting petitioner’s argument that “an upward adjustment 
to an attorney’s fee is never appropriate under § 1988.”). 
 38. S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 1 (1976). 
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cases.”39 Recognizing that many civil rights litigants are people who 
have “little or no money with which to hire a lawyer,”40 Congress 
sought to provide the monetary incentive necessary to attract compe-
tent counsel.41 Thus, fees awarded under the federal fee-shifting stat-
utes are supposed to be guided “by the same standards which prevail 
in other types of equally complex Federal litigation . . . and not [to] be 
reduced because the rights involved may be nonpecuniary in na-
ture.”42 
Over the past thirty years, the Supreme Court has addressed a va-
riety of factors that should and should not be considered when de-
termining a “reasonable fee” under fee-shifting statutes. The Supreme 
Court first addressed the issue in Hensley v. Eckerhart.43 In Hensley, 
the Court held that “the most useful starting point for determining 
the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably ex-
pended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.”44 The 
Court noted that “other factors,” as enumerated in Johnson v. Georgia 
Highway Express, Inc.,45 might also be considered in determining a 
reasonable fee, but these other factors were likely already accounted 
for in the lodestar calculation.46 
The Supreme Court gradually narrowed the spectrum of appro-
priate justifications for attorneys’ fees enhancements over the years, 
finding many already accounted for in the lodestar calculation. For in-
                                                     
 39. Brief for Law and Economics Scholars, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Perdue v. Kenny A., No. 08-970 (U.S. Aug. 28, 2009). 
 40. S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 6. 
 41. Case Comment, supra note 4, at 338; see William R. Mureiko, A Public Goods Ap-
proach to Calculating Reasonable Fees Under Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes, 1989 DUKE L. J. 
438, 440 (“[T]he general purpose of fee-shifting statutes [is] to provide for complete enforce-
ment of rights Congress has deemed worthy of special protection.”). 
 42. S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 6. 
 43. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); see Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citi-
zens’ Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley I), 478 U.S. 546, 563 (1986) (noting “[w]e first ad-
dressed the question of the proper manner in which to determine a ‘reasonable’ attorney’s fee in 
Hensley v. Eckerhart”). 
 44. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. 
 45. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 46. Hensley, 461 U.S., at 434 n.9. There are twelve factors listed in Johnson v. Georgia 
Highway Express, Inc. that a court should consider in making an awards determination. 488 F.2d 
714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974). The factors are: “time and labor required;” “novelty and difficulty 
of the questions;” “skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;” “preclusion of other 
employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case;” “customary fee;” “whether the fee 
is fixed or contingent;” “time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;” “amount 
involved and the results obtained;” “experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;” “‘un-
desirability’ of the case;” “nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;” 
and “awards in similar cases.” Id. 
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stance, in Blum v. Stenson,47 the Court held that the “novelty and 
complexity of the issues” were already accounted for in the lodestar 
and therefore should not merit a fee enhancement.48 The Blum Court 
further limited the scope of permissible reasons for enhancing attor-
neys’ fees when it denied an enhancement based on the contingent 
nature of success in the case at issue.49 The Court, nonetheless, ex-
pressly noted that an upward adjustment of attorneys’ fees might be 
appropriate in “certain ‘rare’ and ‘exceptional’ cases.”50 Likewise, in 
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air,51 the 
Court held that a generalized determination that counsel’s perform-
ance was of “superior quality” was insufficient to justify enhancement 
without “specific evidence” supporting this determination,52 but did 
not find enhancements to be wholly inconsistent with the award of 
reasonable fees under federal fee-shifting statutes.53 
In NAACP v. City of Evergreen,54 the Eleventh Circuit confronted 
the specific question of whether enhancements could be justified 
based on results achieved in a particular case. The court held that al-
though the extent of results obtained by particular litigation usually 
does not merit an enhancement, one might be justified if the case was 
                                                     
 47. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984). In Blum, the district court granted the lodestar 
plus a fifty percent enhancement to the plaintiffs’ attorneys in a civil rights action. The Supreme 
Court reversed the enhancement. 
 48. Id. at 898–99. 
 49. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992). This issue was addressed earlier 
in the plurality opinion of Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air (Dela-
ware Valley II), 483 U.S. 711 (1987), which held that multipliers for assuming the risk of loss was 
an impermissible consideration for adjusting an attorney’s fee. 
 50. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley I), 478 
U.S. 546, 565 (1986) (citing to Blum and addressing the limited circumstances in which upward 
adjustments are permissible). 
 51. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley I), 478 
U.S. 546 (1986). Although Delaware Valley I was brought under section 304(d) of the Clean Air 
Act, the Court explained that the purposes behind this Act and section 1988 are “nearly identi-
cal.” Id. at 559. 
 52. Id. at 566 (noting that the quality of the winning litigants’ counsels’ representation is 
normally reflected in the reasonable hourly rate, and that to adjust the lodestar based on this 
could result in double counting). The Court did not state that enhancements were always inap-
propriate, but, in dicta, criticized both the district court and court of appeals for failing to pro-
vide specific findings as to why the lodestar was insufficient. 
 53. See Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 728 (addressing the decision to enhance based on 
the risk of nonpayment and finding that enhancement for such risk “should be reserved for ex-
ceptional cases”). Although the Court in City of Burlington v. Dague overruled Delaware Valley 
II to the extent that the lower court’s enhancement was based on the contingent nature of a 
case, the Court still did not render a final judgment on whether enhancements are wholly im-
permissible. 
 54. NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332 (11th Cir. 1987). 
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an “exceptional success.”55 Within a year, the Eleventh Circuit reaf-
firmed its commitment to enhancements in Norman v. Housing Au-
thority,56 noting that if the “results obtained were exceptional, then 
some enhancement of the lodestar might be called for.”57 
Because one of the responsibilities of the Supreme Court is to es-
tablish uniform application of federal law by the lower federal courts, 
the Court may find that Perdue provides the ideal framework to iden-
tify precisely what factors go into the calculation of attorneys’ fees 
awarded under fee-shifting statutes. The Court, however, may decide 
to wholly eliminate fee enhancements, finding them beyond the scope 
of a “reasonable” fee, or it may seek to establish an entirely new 
methodology for determining awards under section 1988. 
IV. HOLDING 
Bound by its prior precedents,58 the Eleventh Circuit begrudgingly 
affirmed59 the district court’s fee enhancement to the winning liti-
                                                     
 55. Id. at 1337. In NAACP the Eleventh Circuit remanded because the district court failed 
to properly consider whether in fact an enhancement of the lodestar was justified. It ruled that 
the district court should “make findings with regard to each of the grounds put forward by the 
[the winning litigants] as warranting an enhancement and relate those findings to its ultimate de-
termination of the issue.” Id.  
 56. Norman v. Hous. Auth., 836 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 57. Id. at 1302. The Norman Court followed this comment by noting that even if results ob-
tained are “exceptional,” no enhancement was justified unless the quality of “representation 
was superior to that which one would reasonably expect . . . .” Id.  
 58. Under the “prior precedent rule, a panel decision is the law of the circuit unless and un-
til it is overruled by the Supreme Court or the en banc court.” Gulf Power Co. v. Fed. Commc’n 
Comm’n, 226 F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2000). See Hurth v. Mitchem, 400 F.3d 857, 862 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (“[W]e are not permitted to reach a result contrary to a prior panel’s decision merely 
because we are convinced it is wrong . . . .”). The Eleventh Circuit cited NAACP v. City of Ev-
ergreen and Norman v. Housing Authority as binding precedents in this case. See NAACP, 812 
F.2d 1332, 1336–37 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding a fee award may be enhanced in some cases, but 
was inappropriate in this instance because the district court failed to find that the relief obtained 
was of great benefit “and represented exceptional success”); Norman, 836 F.2d at 1306 (remand-
ing the case in part because the court “applied the wrong standard” and failed to consider 
whether an adjustment to the lodestar was merited in light of the legal significance of the case). 
Kenny A. v. Perdue was heard by three judges only, not the Eleventh Circuit en banc. 532 F.3d 
1209 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 59. Kenny A., 532 F.3d at 1238. The court opined: “[f]or the reasons we have already ex-
plained at length, we are convinced [the NAACP and Norman holdings are] wrong and con-
flict[] with relevant Supreme Court decisions. Nonetheless, as a later panel we are bound to fol-
low it.” Id. at 1238. The majority also decided not to remand the case because it considered do-
ing so “pointless,” explaining “[t]he district court was so obviously enamored with the perform-
ance of plaintiffs’ counsel and . . . determined to reward them for it, that we have no doubt the 
court would simply reinstate the enhancement . . . . All that a remand would achieve is more de-
lay and the generation of more billable hours.” Id. at 1242. 
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gants.60 Despite its affirmace, the majority of the Eleventh Circuit’s 
three-judge panel rejected the district court’s rationale on three 
grounds. First, the Eleventh Circuit regarded the Supreme Court’s 
frequent emphasis on the “strong presumption” of the lodestar’s rea-
sonableness as meriting a reversal of the fee enhancement.61 It em-
phasized the Court’s discussion of the “rare” and “exceptional” nature 
of a case that merits an enhancement, and concluded that affirming 
the adjustment here would cut against that core aspect of such fee de-
terminations.62 Second, the appeals court rejected each of the district 
court’s reasons for enhancing the award—the advancement of case 
expenses,63 delayed payment,64 and the contingent nature of the 
case65—as either in conflict with Supreme Court precedent or already 
fully reflected in the lodestar award.66 Third, the appeals court con-
demned the enhancement insofar as it compensated plaintiffs’ counsel 
for obtaining a result that went beyond a favorable ruling.67 The pur-
pose of fee-shifting statutes, the court explained, is not to “dazzle[] or 
bedazzle[] the district judge,” but simply to provide “adequate repre-
sentation.”68 
Concurring in the judgment only, Judge Wilson argued that Elev-
enth Circuit case law regarding upward adjustments of the lodestar 
was consistent with Supreme Court precedent, and that the enhance-
ment here was authorized.69 Citing Blum, the concurring opinion con-
cluded that an enhancement of the lodestar was permissible insofar as 
                                                     
 60. Id. at 1236. The Eleventh Circuit also affirmed the award of photocopying copying ex-
penses and the basic lodestar award. Id. at 1219–20. 
 61. See id. at 1223 (concluding that the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act was de-
signed only to provide a “reasonable fee,” not “to improve the financial lot of attorneys”). 
 62. Id. at 1227 (addressing that attorneys “almost always” have to advance expenses and 
deal with delays in reimbursement, thus awarding attorneys enhanced fees based on this would 
not support the Supreme Court’s presumption against enhancements). 
 63. Id. The Eleventh Circuit explained that advancement of case expenses and delay in 
payments under section 1983 actions are “simply the nature of the beast,” and rewarding the 
winning litigants based on these two considerations would eliminate the “exceptional” nature of 
lodestar adjustments. 
 64. Id. (stating that “any delays in payment for professional services rendered is offset by 
the fact that the hourly rates used are those that prevail at the completion of the case instead of” 
at the time the work was done). 
 65. Kenny A., 532 F.3d at 1228 (addressing Dague’s holding that enhancements based on 
the contingent nature of a case are “flatly forbidden”). See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 
U.S. 557, 565 (1992) (barring enhancements based on contingency). 
 66. Id. at 1223, 1225. 
 67. Id. at 1230. The Eleventh Circuit argued that awarding attorneys for “merit-exceeding 
results” would incentivize attorneys to bring meritless claims, and therefore impose high social 
costs. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 1242 (Wilson, J., concurring). 
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it was supported by specific evidence demonstrating that the quality 
of legal representation went beyond what one would expect at the 
given hourly rate.70 Cases that did not result in enhancements, the 
concurring opinion explained, failed to supply specific evidence justi-
fying such enhancements, and for that reason were properly re-
versed.71 
In Kenny A., the concurring opinion found the adjustment to be 
appropriate because the district court provided detailed findings to 
support its conclusion that the lodestar alone was inadequate.72 It also 
noted that “the vindication of a constitutional right against a govern-
ment institution” realized by this settlement created a public benefit 
that further supported the enhancement.73 Thus, unlike the majority 
opinion, the concurring opinion fully supported the district court’s de-
cision to enhance the lodestar award insofar as the district court did 
not find the unadjusted fee to be “reasonable.” 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Eleventh Circuit stated that it upheld the lower court’s deci-
sion despite its reservations because circuit precedent “control[led] 
the outcome of this case,”74 and that if it remanded, only additional, 
unnecessary delay would result.75 The court, however, should not have 
affirmed with such regret. Case law and the fee-shifting statutes per-
mit enhancements beyond that which attorneys receive in the basic 
lodestar calculation on the basis of quality of representation and re-
                                                     
 70. Id. at 1242–43 (Wilson, J., concurring). 
 71. Id. at 1243–44 (Wilson, J., concurring) (“It was this lack of evidentiary support—rather 
than a blanket rule against consideration of the quality of representation or the results ob-
tained—that compelled reversal [in Delaware Valley I], as the Court repeatedly made clear.”); 
see NAACP, 812 F.2d at 1336 (critiquing the lower court for its failure to explicitly state how its 
“findings affected its determination regarding enhancement”); Norman, 836 F.2d at 1306 (also 
critiquing the lower court for its failure to justify a decision not to enhance “with reference to 
the extant substantive law”). 
 72. Kenny A., 532 F.3d at 1247 (Wilson, J., concurring). In assessing the district court’s rul-
ing, Judge Wilson relied upon the district judge’s findings concerning the quality of service ren-
dered, affidavits by four local attorneys discussing appropriate fee awards, the testimony of the 
litigating attorneys, and the district judge’s personal observations of the attorneys’ perform-
ances. 
 73. Id. at 1251 (Wilson, J., concurring). 
 74. Id. at 1242 (majority opinion). 
 75. Id. The majority noted that the tone of the district court’s opinion indicated that if the 
case was remanded the initial decision would remain unchanged. The district court opinion 
stated that the “plaintiff’s counsel brought a higher degree of skill, commitment, dedication, and 
professionalism to this litigation than the Court has seen displayed by the attorneys in any other 
case during its 27 years on the bench.” Id. at 1218. This comment was among other accolades the 
district court bestowed upon the plaintiffs’ counsel. 
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sults obtained. Moreover, public policy considerations demand en-
hancements of the lodestar. Since adjusted fee awards more accu-
rately reflect today’s market rates, the possibility of fee enhancements 
provides a means to attract competent counsel in accordance with 
Congress’s goal in enacting section 1988. 
A. A Lack of Categorical Bars 
One of the majority’s main issues with the district court’s decision 
was the district court’s enhancement of the lodestar by over $4 million 
based on the “superb quality” of the attorneys’ representation.76 The 
Eleventh Circuit found this action to be logically inconsistent with the 
district court’s decision to also reduce the winning litigants’ requested 
lodestar by more than $1 million.77 The Eleventh Circuit also noted 
that there was a greater likelihood of double-counting when courts 
considered the “quality of representation” in determining fees be-
cause this was a factor “presumably fully reflected in the lodestar 
amount.”78 
The Supreme Court has yet to hold that fee enhancements are 
categorically barred. Although the Court’s record reveals a proclivity 
to strike enhancements, the lack of a blanket exclusion on enhance-
ments and careful circumscription of the breadth of the Court’s prior 
rulings to account for enhancements in rare circumstances suggest 
that adjustments continue to be permissible.79 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has noted that a district court’s discretion to determine awards 
under the fee-shifting statutes is part and parcel of determining a 
“reasonable fee.”80 
                                                     
 76. Id. at 1228. 
 77. Id. at 1229 (stating that “bad and excessive billing,” which the plaintiffs’ attorneys 
seemingly engaged in at least to the tune of $1 million, “is inconsistent with superb lawyering”). 
 78. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air (Delaware Val-
ley I), 478 U.S. 546, 566 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 79. See Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 565 (noting that the skill, experience, quality of rep-
resentation, and results obtained are presumably fully reflected in the lodestar, but not necessar-
ily); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983) (“The product of reasonable hours times a 
reasonable rate does not end the inquiry. There remain other considerations that may lead the 
district court to adjust the fee . . . including the important factor of the ‘results obtained’.”); see 
also Brief for New York State Bar Assoc., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 9, 
Perdue v. Kenny A., No. 08-970 (U.S. Aug. 28, 2009) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion not to categorically bar enhancements is a decision based on the lack of a need to do so be-
cause there is “no evidence [suggesting] that the limited availability of such fee enhancements 
has led to the widespread ‘windfalls’”). 
 80. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (1983) (“It remains for the district court to determine what 
fee is reasonable.”); Blanchard v. Bergerson, 489 U.S. 87, 96 (1989) (“It is central to the award-
ing of attorney’s fees under § 1988 that the district court judge, in his or her good judgment, 
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Here, the district judge made a determination based on personal 
observations of the proceedings and evaluations of the results ulti-
mately achieved.81 The district judge assessed the case in light of his 
twenty-seven years on the bench and considered testimony from at-
torneys in the relevant legal market to determine whether an en-
hancement of the lodestar would reflect a “reasonable fee.”82 Al-
though the Eleventh Circuit majority was highly critical of the district 
judge’s reasoning,83 the district court did not make a decision that 
crossed any line barring enhancements. Instead, a majority of the ap-
pellate court made a fact-intensive determination when its only 
charge was to review the lower court for an abuse of discretion.84 The 
concurrence, in contrast, duly noted that the district court’s determi-
nation was one in which it was entitled to reach and accordingly af-
firmed the judgment.85 
B. The Lodestar Two-Step 
Two purposes in particular drove the enactment of the Civil 
Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976. First, section 1988 en-
courages people to bring the types of lawsuits that “vindicate [] im-
portant Congressional policies” covered by the fee-shifting stat-
utes86—lawsuits that redress violations of people’s civil rights. Without 
a statutory mechanism to ensure recovery of a reasonable attorney’s 
fee, it would be economically infeasible for plaintiffs to bring such 
cases.87 As Justice Brennan explained: 
[I]t is highly unlikely that the prospect of a fee equal to a frac-
tion of the damages respondents might recover [in civil rights 
                                                                                                                          
make the assessment of what is a reasonable fee under the circumstances of the case.”). 
 81. Kenny A., 532 F.3d at 1249 (11th Cir. 2008) (Wilson, J., concurring). 
 82. Id. at 1234–35 (majority opinion); id. at 1249 (Wilson, J., concurring). The district judge 
noted that “[a]fter 58 years as a practicing attorney and federal judge, the Court is unaware of 
any other case in which a plaintiff class has achieved such a favorable result on such a compre-
hensive scale.” Id. at 1251 (Wilson, J., concurring). 
 83. See id. at 1231–32 (majority opinion) (addressing, among other issues, its dissatisfaction 
with the district court’s reliance on lawyer affidavits to support its awards determination). The 
majority of the Eleventh Circuit argued that “the lawyers who signed the affidavits have a fi-
nancial interest in keeping the fee award in this case and every case like it as high as possible” 
and consequently their opinions did not provide useful, unbiased insight into whether the hourly 
rate, without enhancement, was appropriate. Id.  
 84. Id. at 1218. 
 85. See id. at 1247–48 (Wilson, J., concurring) (“[I]t is the exclusive province of the judge in 
non-jury trials to assess the credibility of witnesses and to assign weight to their testimony.” 
(quoting Childrey v. Bennett, 997 F.2d 830 (11th Cir. 1993))). 
 86. S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 2 (1976). 
 87. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 579 (1986). 
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cases] would have been sufficient to attract competent coun-
sel. Moreover, since counsel might not have found it economi-
cally feasible to expend the amount of time . . . necessary to 
litigate the case properly, it is even less likely that counsel 
would have achieved the excellent results . . . obtained here. 
Thus, had respondents had to rely on private-sector fee ar-
rangements, they might well have been unable to obtain re-
dress for their grievances. It is precisely for this reason that 
Congress enacted [section] 1988.88 
Second, Congress enacted section 1988 in an attempt to reflect the 
full benefits these types of cases realize, which include a generalized 
benefit to the public at large.89 Section 1988 recognizes that when at-
torneys undertake cases falling under the statute they are acting not 
only for themselves “but also as [] ‘private attorney[s] general,’ vindi-
cating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.”90 
Congress limited awards by incorporating the word “reasonable” 
into the statute, but failed to clarify what comprises a “reasonable” fee 
beyond what is “adequate to attract competent counsel without pro-
ducing windfalls to attorneys.”91 The Supreme Court’s efforts to re-
solve what factors are impermissible considerations when calculating 
attorneys’ fees have done little to elucidate what are permissible con-
siderations when determining fee awards under section 1988. Thus, 
the district courts have been left to particularize what factors beyond 
the basic lodestar calculation can and should be weighed in determin-
ing attorneys’ fees. 
“Courts, Congress, and scholars all agree that if left to private en-
forcement, civil rights [would] likely be significantly under-
enforced.”92 By leaving what little room still remains for the district 
                                                     
 88. Id. at 579–80 (footnote omitted). 
 89. S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 3; see Mureiko, supra note 41, at 440 (describing attorney fee 
shifting as “a mechanism to provide an important ‘public good’”); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The 
Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 662 (noting that 
adjustment is necessary because “[l]itigation sometimes produces benefits beyond those reaped 
by the successful party”). 
 90. S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 3 (noting that to not award attorneys’ fees in these types of 
cases “would be tantamount to repealing the Act itself by frustrating its basic purpose”). The 
Senate Report also stated that “Congress has instructed the courts to use the broadest and most 
effective remedies available to achieve the goals of our civil rights.” Id. 
 91. Id. at 6; see generally Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984) (explaining the extent to 
which “reasonable” is defined by Congress with respect to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988); see also Blanch-
ard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 93 (1989) (“[T]he purpose of § 1988 was to make sure that compe-
tent counsel was available to civil rights plaintiffs . . . .”). 
 92. Mureiko, supra note 41, at 455–56; see also Rowe, supra note 89, at 664 (“[W]hen a leg-
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courts to particularize fee awards with respect to the circumstances of 
a specific case, the Supreme Court will preserve the incentive Con-
gress recognized as necessary to keep lawyers interested in vindicat-
ing the public’s civil rights.93 The lodestar award, without the possibil-
ity of enhancement, does not provide this same incentive. This is 
partly because the “trend in the marketplace is toward greater use of 
performance- or result-based fee structures.”94 The basic lodestar cal-
culation (hours worked multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate) can-
not account for this trend. Therefore, without the possibility of en-
hancements, “the potential remuneration [attorneys] can earn from 
civil rights cases will be, on average, lower than what they can earn in 
matters requiring comparable skill.”95 If the courts are to measure a 
reasonable fee as that which “prevail[s] in other types of equally 
complex Federal litigation,”96 but cannot provide a fee adjustment in 
cases that would usually receive one, attorneys may be discouraged 
from taking such cases, and the awards provided may ultimately re-
flect an unreasonable sum.97 By permitting courts to adjust fees when 
it finds it necessary to do so lawyers are encouraged to take on cases 
Congress has identified as of particular importance, and courts can 
provide for fees more consistent with section 1988’s goals.98 
                                                                                                                          
islature perceives a regular imbalance, it can seek to match adversaries more evenly by adopting 
some form of fee-shifting to prevent disproportionate advantage in access to and use of the legal 
process.”). 
 93. See Rowe, supra note 89, at 663–64 (noting that the “prospect of reimbursement” for 
fees incurred during the course of litigation can “stiffen the resolve of the relatively weaker 
side” . . . and “prevent disproportionate advantage in access to and use of the legal process”). 
 94. Brief for Law and Economics Scholars, supra note 39, at 12. 
 95. Brief for Law and Economics Scholars, supra note 39, at 13. 
 96. S. REP. 94-1011, at 6. 
 97. The lodestar may not in fact be a “reasonable” fee in light of the surrounding circum-
stances. See Norman v. Hous. Auth., 836 F.2d 1292, 1306 (11th Cir. 1988) (remanding for the 
district court to consider “the significance of the results obtained in relation to those sought” 
when making its fee determination); see also Brief in Opposition, supra note 2, at 34 (“[U]pward 
adjustment is only appropriate where the fee as initially calculated by the lodestar would other-
wise be unreasonable, as it was found to be in this case.”). During oral arguments, Mr. Clement, 
counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents, highlighted this point when he stated “the lodestar is not 
a destination. It’s not a complete calculation. The lodestar is a guiding light.” Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 45, Perdue v. Kenny A., No. 08-970 (U.S. Oct. 14, 2009). 
 98. Justice Sotomayor commented to this effect, questioning the petitioner with regard to 
whether counsel “better than the norm” would be as likely to take on cases covered by the fee-
shifting statutes and serve as private attorney generals if enhancements were impermissible. 
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 97, at 24. See Case Comment, supra note 4, at 343 
(“fee-shifting statutes are designed” to encourage lawyers to “undertake public interest litiga-
tion” in the same way they would choose to do so in “claims for which they are paid up front”); 
Samuel R. Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys’ Fees: What is “Reasonable”?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 
281, 324–25 (1977) (“The experience of the marketplace indicates that lawyers generally will not 
provide legal representation on a contingent basis unless they receive a premium for taking that 
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C. Discretionary Awards and the Current State of the Legal Market 
In a radical departure from how clients in the private sector ex-
pected to be billed in the past, clients today increasingly demand that 
their attorneys bill on the basis of value rather than on the basis of 
time spent on a particular matter.99 Consequently, an “overreliance on 
billable hours ‘may not reflect value to the client’,”100 and therein may 
not reflect market value either. Thus, if the Court is to respect both 
the letter and spirit of section 1988, it will need to spend more time 
addressing the changing nature of the legal market and less time wor-
rying about whether enhancements will be awarded haphazardly. 
The explicit purpose behind fee-shifting statutes is to “attract 
competent counsel” with fee awards comparable to what “is tradi-
tional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client.”101 Before 
Blum, most courts chose “an hourly rate in the abstract and then sub-
ject[ed] the fee to a multiplier to allow for individual factors.”102 After 
Blum, the Supreme Court gradually found considerations that might 
otherwise justify a fee enhancement or reduction already accounted 
for in hourly rates.103 This shift was appropriate in light of clients’ in-
creasing preference for hourly-based billing during the 1970s.104 With 
                                                                                                                          
risk.”). 
 99. Brief for Law and Economics Scholars, supra note 39, at 8. 
 100. Brief for Law and Economics Scholars, supra note 39, at 9. 
 101. S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 6. See also Brief for Law and Economics Scholars, supra note 
39, at 11–12 (“Lawyers, like other service providers, operate in an economic market . . . [and], as 
a general matter . . . will accept a particular representation only if the lawyer expects to earn 
fees that are at least equal to the fees he would earn if he accepted an alternative matter.”). 
 102. LAYCOCK, supra note 31, at 922; Telephone Interview with Neil Williams, Managing 
Partner 1984–96, Alston & Bird (Oct. 19, 2009) (discussing that in the earlier days of lawyering a 
“reasonable fee” was discussed only after a matter closed, and then only in terms of the facts, 
circumstances, and results achieved by counsel, not the number of hours spent). Thus, when 
courts used to determine an award based on the value procured rather than hours spent multi-
plied by the hourly rate, judges were calculating awards in accordance with how the market 
compensated attorneys at that time. 
 103. LAYCOCK, supra note 31, at 922. 
 104. See Brief for Law and Economics Scholars, supra note 39, at 7. In 2009, THE 
AMERICAN LAWYER published a number of articles addressing the gradually changing nature of 
law firm billing practices in light of clients’ and general counsels’ demands for better cost-
management and high quality work product. See Brian Baxter, Cost Control More Important 
Than Compliance, THE AM. LAWYER, Nov. 4, 2009, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202435168836 (reporting on a study by the 
Association of Corporate Counsel, which found that in in-house counsels’ efforts to control the 
costs of outside counsel the “use of alternative fee structures rose to sixty-one percent [by] in-
house counsel” although hourly billing rates still remained “the norm”); Ursula Furi-Perry, 
Coupons Not Required: GCs Look for Creative Ways to Save on Legal Costs, GC MID-
ATLANTIC, July 6, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id= 
1202431987114&thepage=1 (reporting that the “biggest talk of the town at corporate law de-
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the economic downturn, however, the market for legal services is 
changing once again, and the award of reasonable attorneys’ fees un-
der section 1988 ought reflect this.105 Should the Court decide not to 
follow current market trends and further remove judicial involvement 
from the determination of fee calculations, lawyers may be encour-
aged (or at least not discouraged) from “run[ning] the meter” in order 
to increase their awards as determined by the traditional lodestar cal-
culation.106 This problem may be exacerbated because, in general, en-
hancements are awarded sparingly,107 yet, downward adjustments are 
still widely regarded as part and parcel of the judiciary’s authority to 
cut “hours spent unnecessarily or inefficiently” when such time is in-
cluded in the initial lodestar calculation.108 
                                                                                                                          
partments is the use of alternative fee arrangements” and finding arrangements based on 
“value-based fees, which are based on the type of work performed and the value it has to the 
client, rather than a strict hourly measure” among the most common alternatives); Law Firm 
Leaders Survey 2009: Billing, THE AM. LAWYER, http://www.law.com/jsp/ 
tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202435770978 (providing data on “all firms,” in addition to firms in 
New York, Washington DC, and Chicago, and finding that of those firms using value-based bill-
ing, the overwhelming majority did so because clients requested it and the firms suggested it). In 
response to the question “approximately what percentage of your matters included a value-
based/nonhourly fee component?” firms in the Law Firm Leaders Survey 2009 responded as fol-
lows: All firms (fourteen percent); New York (nineteen percent); Washington DC (ten percent); 
Chicago (eleven percent). Id. 
 105. Interview with Neil Williams, supra note 102. Williams noted that standard billing prac-
tices will likely be modified due to increasing competitive pressures in the private legal sector 
and the need for budget and expense control in the corporate world. 
 106. Brief for Law and Economics Scholars, supra note 39, at 13. Justice Ginsburg touched 
upon the limited circumstances in which lodestar adjustments are made when she asked Mr. 
Shah, amicus for the defendants/petitioners, how it is that a judge can adjust downward for poor 
performance, but should not be allowed enhance the award for a superior performance. Mr. 
Shah, who agreed that judges should be permitted to adjust downward for poor performance, 
cabined his response by explaining that the situations in which this adjusting occurs should be 
quite limited. Mr. Shah’s response supports the respondents’ argument that enhancements, like 
reductions, should be permitted by the courts, but limited in their application. Transcript of 
Oral Argument, supra note 97, at 20–21; see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983) 
(“There is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations. The district court may 
attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award 
to account for the limited success. The court necessarily has discretion in making this equitable 
judgment.”). 
 107. See Brief in Opposition, supra note 2, at 23 (explaining that in the past seventeen years, 
attorneys in sixty-seven federal cases have requested upward adjustments, but only nine en-
hancements have survived appeal). 
 108. LAYCOCK, supra note 31, at 922; Brief of Law and Economics Scholars, supra note 39, 
at 13 (recognizing that “it is not unusual for courts to reduce a lawyer’s actual market rate . . . 
before calculating the lodestar”). The district judge’s decision to reduce the requested lodestar 
by sixteen percent in Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue exemplifies the discretion judges exercise 
when making fee determinations. 454 F.Supp.2d 1260, 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2006). 
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VI. ARGUMENTS/DISPOSITION 
Though the question presented to the Supreme Court isolated the 
quality of performance and results obtained as the factors at issue in 
Perdue, the Justices’ questions at oral argument suggested that what 
most concerns the Court is whether enhancements of the lodestar, in 
general, are ever permissible.109 Because a majority of the Court 
seemed greatly perturbed by the possibility of exorbitant legal fees, 
the Court will probably reverse the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment and 
tailor its ruling to find that the disputed factors are already ade-
quately accounted for in the lodestar calculation.110 In doing so, the 
Court will severely narrow the scope of attorneys’ fee awards under 
federal fee-shifting statutes. 
A. Redundant Compensation 
The Supreme Court has eliminated possible justifications for fee 
enhancements point-by-point over the years, but one constant has 
remained—an emphasis on specific findings that support a court’s de-
cision that some particular factor was not adequately accounted for in 
the lodestar.111 Indeed, the main reason the Eleventh Circuit re-
manded NAACP and Norman was because the district courts failed to 
correlate their decisions denying enhancement with specific reasons 
                                                     
 109. When discussing a hypothetical fee award during oral arguments, Justice Breyer com-
mented “I am tempted to think: Well, very high is enough. You don’t need very, very, very 
high” and expressed his concern that average people would not be able to understand “very, 
very, very high” fee awards. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 97, at 35. Justice Alito 
noted that unlike a “private litigation where the money is coming out of the pocket of the cor-
poration,” here “[i]t’s coming out of the pocket of taxpayers [and] that is very troubling.” Id. at 
28. 
 110. See Tony Mauro, High Court Justices Doubt Lawyers Should Be Paid Extra for Win-
ning, Nat’l L.J., Oct. 15, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/ jsp/article.jsp?id=1202434599147 
(noting that during oral arguments the “[J]ustices seemed more worried about high legal fees 
than in encouraging quality lawyers to do public-minded work”); see also Street, supra note 7 
(“Both points have flaws . . . [b]ut the oral argument showed that the children have greater 
problems to contend with.”); Robert Barnes, Justices Weigh $4.5 Million Bonus Awarded Law-
yers in Ga. Litigation: Judge was Impressed by Attorneys’ Work on Foster-Care Case, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 15, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ arti-
cle/2009/10/14/AR2009101403768.html (“Although the winning lawyers in the case are sup-
ported . . . by an array of liberal and conservative public interest groups . . . the reaction of the 
justices seemed to divide into ideological camps.”). 
 111. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437–38 (1983) (emphasizing the importance of 
clear findings that consider the “relationship between the amount of the fee awarded and the 
results obtained” in order for an enhancement to be justified). The Hensley Court reversed the 
lower court’s decision because it held that it did not adequately answer the question of why the 
award was in fact “reasonable.” Id. See also Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 889 (1984) (vacating 
the district court’s enhancement for a failure to adequately justify it). 
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for the compensation awarded.112 Drawing on prior similar cases,113 the 
Court may choose to reverse the fee, finding that the district court in 
Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue failed to justify its conclusion with a 
proper rationale for enhancing the fee award. 
The district court’s decision to award an enhancement was justi-
fied partially because the settlement vindicated the civil rights of so 
many individuals.114 In Blum, for example, the district court had justi-
fied its enhancement, in part, for the same reason.115 But, the Supreme 
Court found that the enhancement was unreasonable because the dis-
trict court had not explained “exactly how this determination affected 
the fee award, . . . [and because] record evidence [failed to] show[] 
that the benefit achieved require[d] an upward adjustment to the 
fee.”116 
The district court’s other reasons for supporting a fee enhance-
ment included the attorneys’ advancement of case expenses, lack of 
payment on an on-going basis, and the contingency of success in the 
case. Each of these justifications have also been addressed in prior 
Court cases and been found not to merit enhancements as they are 
presumably adequately accounted for in the lodestar117 or strictly pro-
hibited as a justification for enhancement.118 At oral argument, the 
                                                     
 112. See NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332, 1336–37 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding the 
district court’s award, which did not include an enhancement, unfounded without findings justi-
fying its decision not to do so); Norman v. Hous. Auth., 836 F.2d 1292, 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 
1988) (remanding in part because the court “applied the wrong standard”). 
 113. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992); Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citi-
zens’ Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley II), 483 U.S. 711 (1987); Pennsylvania v. Del. Val-
ley Citizens’ Counsel for Clean Air (Delaware Valley I), 478 U.S. 546 (1986); Blum v. Stenson, 
465 U.S. 886 (1984). None of these cases explicitly precluded fee enhancements, but, for various, 
related reasons, reversed fee enhancements by the lower courts. 
 114. Kenny A. v. Perdue, 532 F.3d 1209, 1230 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 115. Blum, 465 U.S. at 898. In Blum, the respondents argued that a fee enhancement was 
merited in part because the “results were of far-reaching significance to a large class of people.” 
One of the reasons the district court awarded the enhancement, it stated, was because of the 
“great benefit” the case brought to the plaintiff class. The Supreme Court, however, held that 
this reasoning alone did not merit a fee enhancement. Id. 
 116. Id. at 900. The Blum Court’s opinion also emphasized that nothing in the record sug-
gested that the fee, unadjusted, would be unreasonable. Id. at 898. In addition, the Blum Court 
noted that the winning litigants did “not claim, or even mention, entitlement to a bonus or up-
ward revision” in their affidavits. Id. 
 117. See Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 564 (explaining that although Johnson factors may 
be considered when determining whether a fee should be adjusted, they are usually “subsumed 
within the initial calculation”). Each of the district court’s reasons could potentially be recog-
nized as fitting under one of the twelve factors listed in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 
Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 118. See Dague, 505 U.S. at 567 (holding enhancement based on contingency is not permit-
ted). 
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Justices expressed concern as to what enhanced compensation would 
actually compensate for outside of the lodestar calculation.119 The 
Court could find that attorneys’ hourly rates and the amount of time 
they spend on a matter inherently subsume all the considerations that 
lower courts have previously identified as independent of the basic 
lodestar calculation and therefore do not justify an adjustment. If the 
Supreme Court finds this to be the case, it could logically conclude 
that fee enhancements are improper because they result in double-
counting. 
B. A Preference for “Simple” Calculations 
Perhaps one of the strongest arguments for the defendants’ attor-
neys is the seemingly unbounded discretion afforded to the lower 
courts if the district court’s decision is affirmed. During oral argu-
ments Justice Alito lamented that enhancements have introduced 
complications into otherwise straightforward fee calculations.120 If the 
Court rules that all the Johnson factors are already subsumed within 
the lodestar, then it becomes that much more difficult to determine 
what else could possibly justify the award of additional monies.121 If 
the Supreme Court decides that attorney fee awards under section 
1988 ought be determined solely by multiplying the number of hours 
expended by a reasonable rate, this may indeed simplify the figures 
that go into determining a reasonable fee and address the Court’s 
concern regarding the possibility of “second major litigation[s]” over 
attorneys’ fees.122 
                                                     
 119. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 97, at 30–32 (comment of Chief Justice 
Roberts) (“I don’t understand the concept of extraordinary success or results obtained. The re-
sults that are obtained are presumably the results that are dictated or command[ed] or required 
under the law. And it’s not like, well, you had a really good attorney, so I’m going to say the law 
means this, which gives you a lot more, but if you had a bad attorney I would say the law has 
this and so he doesn’t get a multiplier. The results obtained under our theory should be what the 
law requires, and not different results because you have different lawyers.”). 
 120. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 97, at 27–28 (comment of Justice Alito) 
(pointing out that the “great advantage in doing things mechanically” is that “it provides an 
element of fairness,” and noting that “what troubles me about” the district court’s method is 
that “it seems totally standardless, and I see no way of policing it . . . I see a great danger”). 
 121. Street, supra note 7 (“If a majority of the Justices do not believe that argument, it is dif-
ficult to see how they can overlook their other concerns and give district judges discretion to 
enhance fee awards based on the amorphous concepts of results obtained and quality of per-
formance without guaranteeing years of future litigation that could drain state governments of 
even more money.”). 
 122. See Dague, 505 U.S. at 566 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)). 
Although contingency is no longer a basis for enhancement, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Dague 
highlights the Court’s interest in not fomenting litigation after a case has ended. Justice Scalia 
stated that an “interest in ready administrability” and “the related interest in avoiding burden-
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The Supreme Court’s distaste for case-specific adjudications may 
overshadow any desire to compensate based on the actual value real-
ized in an individual case.123 As evidenced during oral arguments, Jus-
tice Scalia voiced his concern that the district court’s enhancement 
was more an exercise in random judicial decision-making than 
thoughtful, discretionary adjudication.124 But, the extent to which a 
judge’s decision to enhance a fee award can be deemed “random” will 
also call into question many other relatively discretionary determina-
tions a judge regularly makes with only a reasonableness standard to 
guide his decision.125 If the Supreme Court holds that the district 
court’s award here was unreasonable, it will likely recalculate the fee 
award using the basic lodestar calculation,126 which may signal that the 
Court finds itself no longer capable or willing to square judicial dis-
cretion with calculating a “reasonable attorney’s fee.” 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Given the Supreme Court’s many decisions striking down fee en-
hancements, if it decides to follow suit in Perdue, the Court may soon 
see a noticeable drop in the number of civil rights cases litigated as 
economically rational lawyers decide to leave such cases to lawyers 
                                                                                                                          
some satellite litigation” underlay the Court’s adoption of the lodestar approach. Id. at 566. 
 123. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178 
(1989) (“When I was in law school, I was a great enthusiast for . . . reading the ‘holding’ of a de-
cision narrowly, thereby leaving greater discretion to future courts. Over the years, however . . . 
I have found myself drawn more and more to the opposite view.”). Scalia further noted that 
“[t]he trouble with the discretion-conferring approach to judicial law making is that it does not 
satisfy [the sense of justice as proscribed by the Equal Protection Clause] . . . . Rudimentary jus-
tice requires that those subject to the law must have the means of knowing what is prescribes.” 
Id. at 1178–79. 
 124. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 97, at 38–39 (comment of Justice Scalia). To 
further his point that fee enhancements might be regarded as arbitrary, Justice Scalia explained 
that it seemed to him that if a new judge was on the bench, then attorneys litigating in an 
equally meritorious fashion to those in Perdue could very well not receive a fee enhancement 
simply because their judge might lack the experience to identify whether this is some of the best 
lawyering he or she might ever witness. Justice Scalia commented that you, a lawyer before a 
first time appointment to the bench, would have to “kiss good-bye to your . . . extra money for 
being excellent.” Id. 
 125. For example, the reasonableness standard guides judicial determinations of general 
remedy-crafting, punitive damage awards, criminal sentencing, and accommodations made for 
religion under Title VII and disabled persons under the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
 126. During oral arguments, Justice Breyer calculated that if one were to break down the 
post-enhancement award in Perdue it would be equivalent to an attorney charging approxi-
mately $350 per hour. He addressed how this amount, multiplied by 2000 billable hours, would 
result in compensation totaling $700,000 per year for the particular attorney. He responded to 
his own hypothetical with a “wow!” and conveyed concern about the size of such an award. 
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 97, at 33–34. 
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whose jobs regularly involve handling such matters.127 If, however, the 
Court decides it ought to follow market trends and award attorneys 
based on the value of the work they provide to their clients, then the 
number of those interested in bringing meritorious claims covered by 
the fee-shifting statutes may rise because pursing cases covered by 
section 1988 would be comparably lucrative to pursuing cases in the 
private-sector. Though rejecting the enhancement in Perdue may al-
low for fee determinations that seem straightforward, determining 
appropriate hourly rates in the relevant legal market and a reasonable 
number of hours may be as much an exercise in judicial discretion as 
the alternative. The Supreme Court, nevertheless, often prefers to rely 
on traditional standards and seemingly clear lines, which may seem at 
odds with a ruling that encourages judges to award fees based upon 
considerations other than the number of hours worked at a prescribed 
rate. Eliminating an aspect of decisionmaking in which judges might 
seem untethered to clear guidelines and standards could prove very 





                                                     
 127. See Brief for Law and Economics Scholars, supra note 39, at 13 (predicting that lawyers 
of “sufficient skill and experience” will not take cases falling under section 1988 if there is no 
longer the possibility of enhancement). 
